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Disparate Effects in the Criminal Justice System:
A Response to Randall Kennedy's Comment
and Its Legacy
Janai S. Nelson*
I. INTRODUCTION
For many African Americans, the criminal justice system symbolizes
an oppressive force, and yet, is a necessary institution in an increasingly
lawless society. We' are at the same time its victims and beneficiaries,
although various sentiments exist regarding the extent to which we are
either. It is precisely this paradox, coupled with the promulgation of cer-
tain criminal legislation and legal precedent which directly and, potentially,
adversely affect the African-American community, 2 that inspired me to ad-
dress the issues and arguments raised in Randall Kennedy's The State,
Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment3 and their resound-
ing implications.4
In particular, this Essay focuses on two timely and controversial law
enforcement issues facing the courts and the African-American commu-
nity: the crack/powder cocaine distinction in criminal statutes and selective
prosecution claims based on the disparity between federal and state sen-
tencing schemes. I examine the experiences of our community that shape
our response to these issues by addressing the constitutional claims raised
by African-American defendants in two portentous criminal cases-one
state and one federal-and confronting important arguments made by
Kennedy in the areas of law enforcement and constitutional analysis. In
* Articles Editor, UCLA Law Review; Consulting Editor, National Black Law Journal.
J.D., 1996, UCLA School of Law; B.A., 1993, New York University. I would like to thank the
National Black Law Journal for its quality editorship. In addition, I am grateful to the UCLA
externship program for providing me the opportunity to extern in the chambers of the Honorable
Judge Stephen Reinhardt where I was encouraged to explore issues of criminal justice.
1. Throughout this Essay I have chosen to part with the convention among authors of legal
scholarship of not identifying themselves as a member of a group about which they write for in
certain contexts, like this one, self-identification clarifies the author's perspective for her audi-
ence. It should be noted that (since its inception) narrative legal scholarship has been a refresh-
ing exception to this norm.
2. For an intriguing definition of "the Black community," see generally Regina Austin, "The
Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1769, 1769-
70 (1989).
3. 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1261-70 (1994) [hereinafter Kennedy, Comment].
Randall Kennedy is a professor at Harvard Law School and a well-noted legal scholar who
happens to be African American. My description of Randall Kennedy as a legal scholar "who
happens to be African American" is meant to convey that legal scholars are not intrinsically of
any particular race or ethnicity, e.g., white, as the term "African-American legal scholar" might
suggest by its obvious distinction.
4. Kennedy's comment already has helped to persuade a circuit court to uphold the crack/
cocaine distinction in sentencing against an equal protection challenge. See United States v.
Thompson, 27 F.3d 671, 678 n.3 (1994)("The severe penalties for crack offenses actually help
rather than hurt law-abiding African-Americans.") (quoting Kennedy, Comment, supra note 3).
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addition, I explore briefly the implications of Kennedy's arguments in these
and other like cases.5
The first case, State v. Russell,6 involves the infamous crack/powder
cocaine distinction in a Minnesota criminal statute. Kennedy's Comment
characterizes this case as an example of a state court's erroneous decision
to equalize sentencing among crack and powder cocaine offenders in re-
sponse to "misguided" claims of racial discrimination from African-Ameri-
can criminal defendants and, presumably, a segment of the African-
American community.7 In the second case, United States v. Armstrong,
8
the Supreme Court elucidated the threshold requirements for establishing
a selective prosecution claim based on allegations that African-American
defendants are prosecuted more frequently in federal rather than state
courts for cocaine-related offenses and are, consequently, subject to har-
sher penalties. In addition, the Court articulated the evidentiary showing
necessary to entitle such defendants to discovery. Armstrong offers an op-
portunity to examine the implications of Kennedy's arguments in shaping
rules that affect the discovery of evidence, and, by consequence, a defend-
5. In a perceptive analysis published after this Essay was written, Professor David Cole has
set forth arguments similar to many of those raised here. See David Cole, The Paradox of Race
and Crime: A Comment on Randall Kennedy's "Politics of Distinction", 83 GEO. L.J. 2547 (1995).
This Essay has since been edited to include case developments and additional citations.
Professor Kennedy has responded thoughtfully to Cole's arguments. See Randall Kennedy,
A Response to Professor Cole's "Paradox of Race and Crime", 83 GEO. L.J. 2573 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Kennedy, A Response]. However, Professor Kennedy's response fails to address the flaws in
his critique of the Russell court's rationality review analysis. See infra pp. 8-13. Furthermore,
Kennedy argued that more consideration should be given to the viewpoints of Black congressper-
sons and the opinions expressed in the Black and Latino caucuses on issues of law enforcement,
which he contends, might support the idea of increased law enforcement. Kennedy, A Response,
supra, at 2574-75.
However, as I argue in Part II, the underlying premise of Kennedy's suggestion that only
legislation that is facially discriminatory or proven to be discriminatory by direct evidence of
discriminatory intent should be subject to Equal Protection challenge because certain members of
the African-American community, including our elected representatives, might favor increased
law enforcement legislation is entirely inconsistent with the constitutional fundament that the
Equal Protection Clause applies to classes in their entireties and not particular segments of a
class. Indeed, the alleged benefit that increased law enforcement via harsher sentencing of Afri-
can-American drug offenders confers upon law-abiding African-Americans is insufficient to out-
weight the burden. Moreover, it is incapable of withstanding constitutional challenge on that
rationale that it benefits a subgroup of a protected class consitutionally. Thus, this Essay seeks to
invite discussion on how to meld interests in law enforcement and equal protection as they have
been juxtaposed in Kennedy's Comment. In addition, this Essay explores Kennedy's arguments
in an equally controversial area of criminal law-selective prosecution based on the federal/state
sentencing disparity.
6. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
7. See Kennedy, Comment, supra note 3, at 1261-70.
8. 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
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ant's ability to prove discriminatory intent,9-a crucial element in estab-
lishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 10
Accordingly, Part II sets forth Kennedy's arguments regarding race
and law enforcement presented in his Comment." I critique and examine
several weaknesses in Kennedy's theories in Part III and highlight impor-
tant counterarguments that he either failed to address or addressed insuffi-
ciently. Finally, in Part IV, I test the consistency and application of
Kennedy's arguments in cases such as Armstrong and conclude by develop-
ing Kennedy's community-oriented approach into a paradigm that is not so
fundamentally hostile to racial discrimination claims based solely upon dis-
parate impact.
II. THE STATE, CRIMINAL LAW, AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION:
KENNEDY'S COMMENT
In a provocative comment on criminal law, law enforcement, and ra-
cial discrimination, Randall Kennedy challenges contenders on both sides
of the debate with his refutation of discrimination claims that is paired with
a condemnation of the criminal justice system for denying African Ameri-
cans equal protection in the area of criminal law.' 2 Kennedy bases his ar-
guments in the context of the crack/powder cocaine distinction. He asserts
that disparate sentencing for possession of these different substances is, if
not appropriate, 13 certainly nondiscriminatory.
This assertion has serious implications not only in respect of the crack/
powder cocaine distinction, but in most other instances where African
Americans are disparately and adversely impacted by criminal law enforce-
ment. The state/federal prosecution distinction is another example that il-
lustrates the difficulty of proving racial discrimination in disparate impact
contexts and offers an opportunity to explore what rules will provide dispa-
rately impacted communities the next best available recourse aside from
per se invalidation of suspect laws or practices. In this light, this section
examines Kennedy's general arguments and their implications in the crack/
powder cocaine and state/federal prosecution contexts.
9. In stating that discriminatory intent is necessary to invalidate legislation on federal equal
protection grounds, Kennedy echoes the holding of the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Washington v. Davis and its progeny defined the roles of disparate impact and discriminatory
intent in federal equal protection doctrine. In short, courts cannot invalidate legislation that is
not "traced to a discriminatory purpose." 426 U.S. at 240. In Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979), the Court interpreted discriminatory purpose as legislative action that is "at
least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group,"
emphasizing the necessity of discriminatory intent. Id. at 279.
10. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
11. Kennedy, Comment, supra note 3.
12. See generally i.
13. See id. at 1259 & n.19 (arguing that the African American community benefits as a whole
from increased law enforcement that results in the conviction of African-American lawbreakers,
especially in light of statistical evidence that African Americans constitute an overwhelming ma-
jority of crime victims of African-American offenders).
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A. Kennedy's Arguments
Kennedy frames the debate on the disparate effects of criminal law
enforcement in the African-American community in terms of two specific
contentions. First, he characterizes allegations of pervasive racial discrimi-
nation in the criminal justice system as "overblown and counterproductive"
and implies that such allegations "detract attention from other problems of
law enforcement that warrant more consideration.' 1 4 Although he never
disproves these allegations, and even offers proof of racial discrimination
within the criminal justice system,'5 Kennedy strongly denounces reliance
on such allegations unless there is proof of discriminatory intent. 16 Fur-
thermore, Kennedy disregards conspiracy theories or any charges of insti-
tutionalized racial oppression absent self-incriminating avowals of racism
or some other just-as-unlikely-to-happen showing of discriminatory
intent. 17
Second, Kennedy identifies the state's failure to "provide black com-
munities with the equal protection of the laws" and "under-enforcement of
the laws" as "the main problems" facing the African-American community
today.' 8 Kennedy links this deprivation of law enforcement to a phenome-
non that he has previously labeled race-of-the-victim discrimination' 9 and
to "a misguided antagonism toward efforts to preserve public safety."20
Moreover, Kennedy purports that it is in the African-American commu-
nity's best interest to grant law enforcement agencies more power despite
the fact that doing so might narrow individual liberties.2'
To elucidate these points, Kennedy focuses on State v. Russell,22 a Min-
nesota Supreme Court case which invalidated a state statute that imposed
14. Id at 1255-56.
15. d
16. Id. at 1269, 1259.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1256, 1259.
19. See id. at 1255-56. In an earlier article, Kennedy articulated his theory of race-of-the-
victim discrimination in the context of capital sentencing as the denial of "the right of black
victims or potential victims of murder to a response on the part of the state that is equally vigor-
ous as that which follows the murder of whites." Randall Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race,
Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1390 (1988) [hereinafter
Kennedy, McClesky]. Kennedy engages in a thorough discussion of the notorious Supreme Court
death penalty, of McClesky v. Kemp, 107 U.S. 1756, 1763 (1987), which many have likened to such
nefarious cases as Plessy v. Ferguson, Korematsu v. United States, and Dred Scott v. Sanford. See
Hugo Bedau, Someday McClesky Will Be Death Penalty's Dred Scott, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1987,
§ 2, at 5; see also Kennedy, McClesky, supra, at 1389. In essence race-of -the-victim discrimina-
tion, as it is represented by the McClesky case "involves racial inequality in the provision of a
peculiar sort of public good-capital sentencing." Kennedy, McClesky, supra, at 1394. Ken-
nedy's McClesky article is a good source for understanding the general arguments and assump-
tions that undergird some of his positions critiqued in this Comment.
20. Kennedy, Comment, supra note 3, at 1256. By this characterization, Kennedy is presuma-
bly referring to opposition by minority communities to laws that disparately affect minority crimi-
nal offenders despite the arguable benefit that such enforcement can confer by eliminating crime
in those same communities. However, Kennedy does not address this as a specific cause of une-
qual protection in his Comment.
21. lId at 1260. But see Cole, supra note 5, at 2555-62 for a thoughtful discussion of the
effects of law enforcement in the African-American community, which challenges Kennedy's
position.
22. Supra note 6, at 891 (Minn. 1991). Russell is the only case to date holding that the crack/
powder cocaine distinction in sentencing is unconstitutional. A federal district court in Missouri
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an asymmetrical sentencing scheme for crack and powder cocaine offenses.
Specifically, the Russell court held that the prosecution had not provided a
"rational basis" for the distinction in punishment in light of the disparate
impact of the statute on African Americans.23
The defendants in Russell, all of whom are African-American, were
charged with the unlawful possession of a minimum of three grams of crack
cocaine, a charge which carries a maximum penalty of twenty years impris-
onment under the challenged statute.24 By contrast, possession of an equal
amount of powder cocaine carries a maximum penalty of five years impris-
onment.25 Considered another way, to be eligible for a twenty-year term of
imprisonment one must possess ten times the amount of powder cocaine
than crack cocaine.26 What this means in actuality under the sentencing
guidelines is that defendants are presumptively sentenced to 48 months of
imprisonment for possession of three grams of crack cocaine and only to 12
months for possession of an equal amount of powder cocaine.27
In support of their claim that the statute violated the equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the defendants presented, inter alia,
evidence that 96.6% of those persons charged with crack cocaine posses-
sion are African-American while nearly eighty percent of those charged
with powder cocaine possession are white.28 This disparity, they argued,
has a discriminatory impact on African Americans because African Ameri-
cans are more likely to be subject to longer periods of incarceration for
cocaine 29 possession than are whites. Minnesota's highest court agreed.
Kennedy, however, does not.
Kennedy charges that the Russell court erred in the following ways: (1)
The Court improperly based its decision on the racial discrimination aspect
of the claim and (2) it failed to give proper weight to evidence that tended
to show a rational basis for the crack/powder distinction.3" Kennedy points
to several instances in the court's opinion where the issue of racial injustice
appeared to animate the court and contends that these emotionally charged
sentiments inappropriately clouded the court's judgment to the detriment
of the very class of persons it aimed to protect. 31 However, a careful read-
ing of the opinion reveals that the element of racial injustice prompted the
court's constitutional inquiry but did not form the basis of its decision.32
held similarly in a decision rendered three years after Russell and was overturned on appeal. See
United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo. 1994), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 887.
25. Id. at 887.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 887 n.1.
29. In this Essay, the unmodified term "cocaine" refers to powder cocaine and its chemical
derivatives, including crack cocaine. I use the terms "crack cocaine" and "powder cocaine" to
differentiate the substances at issue in this Essay.
30. Kennedy, Comment, supra note 3, at 1262-66.
31. See id. at 1262-63.
32. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888 n.2 (emphasis added) ("While we are ordinarily loathe to
intrude or even inquire into the legislative process on matters of criminal punishment, the corre-
lation between race and the use of cocaine base or powder and the gross disparity in resulting
punishment cries out for closer scrutiny of the challenged laws.").
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Rather, it was the court's findings as a result of its rational basis analysis
that supported its holding.3
3
Furthermore, Kennedy rejects the court's rational basis analysis on the
ground that the court erroneously conducted a strict scrutiny analysis and,
as a result, discounted the evidence presented by the prosecution which
established a rational basis for the distinction in punishment. Of the three
pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution, 34 Kennedy seems most
distressed by the court's handling of evidence that crack is more potent
than powder cocaine, which the court seemed to accept as probative.35
However, the court found that this potency differential did not provide a
rational basis for disparate punishment because it relies on the manner in
which the cocaine is ingested since powder cocaine can produce the same
physiological results as crack cocaine if ingested intravenously.3 6 Kennedy
criticizes this analysis because it relies on the hypothetical that powder co-
caine users actually ingest the substance intravenously rather than by snort-
ing it-a method which has been proven to produce a less potent effect-
and ignores the actual effects of crack versus powder cocaine use.37 Ironi-
cally, Kennedy argues that the court should focus on actual real world oc-
currences rather than ruling on legal fiction.38
Admittedly, the court's argument that the punishment distinction
should not exist because powder cocaine could produce effects similar to
crack cocaine if ingested intravenously was its least cogent in support of its
holding. However, this rationale is at least consistent with other statutory
schemes governing drug offenses.39 Furthermore, the court provided am-
ple analysis to justify its holding under rationality review. For example, in
response to the prosecution's primary justification for the crack/powder co-
caine punishment distinction, the court found that the testimony of a
county attorney whose knowledge that possession of three grams of crack
cocaine indicated drug dealing whereas possession of an equal amount of
cocaine did not, was derived from informal discourse "from the streets"
constituted "an arbitrary rather than a genuine and substantial distinc-
tion." 0 Kennedy strongly criticizes the court for dismissing this testimony
as "purely anecdotal."'" However, evidence that nine grams of powder co-
caine can yield a nearly equal amount of crack cocaine cuts against the
notion that possession of a smaller amount of crack cocaine than powder
cocaine indicates dealing, and thus substantiates the court's finding.42
33. See infra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
34. The prosecution offered a variety of evidence to prove that (1) crack is more potent than
powder cocaine, (2) each substance has different sociologies of distribution, and (3) higher levels
of violence are associated with the use and distribution of crack. See Russell, 477 N.W.2d, at 889-
91.
35. Kennedy, Comment, supra note 3, 1264-65.
36. Russell, 477 N.W. 2d 886, 890.
37. Kennedy, Comment, supra note 3, at 1265.
38. This argument is ironic because, as I argue in Part IV, by requiring a showing of discrimi-
natory intent in order to challenge legislation and law enforcement practice, and ignoring the
realities of historical and contemporary racism, Kennedy subscribes to the same sort of legal
surrealism upon which he alleges the Russell court based its opinion.
39. See infra pp. 13-14.
40. Russell 447 N.W. 2d at 889.
41. Kennedy, Comment, supra note 3, at 1264 (quoting Russell, 447 N.W.2d at 889).
42. See id. at 891 & n.7.
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In addition, Kennedy took exception to the court's finding that the
legislative record failed to prove that the alleged higher level of violence
associated with crack cocaine was directly related to the pharmacological
composition of crack cocaine and not simply a byproduct of the urban envi-
ronment in which it is used and distributed. Finally, Kennedy maintains
that the court failed to acknowledge any of the substantially distinguishing
factors between crack and powder cocaine.43 However, it might not be that
the court believes that nothing substantially differentiates the two sub-
stances as much as it is a reluctance to devise such a distinction since the
legislature has not done so in other contexts.
For example, marijuana can be rolled into a cigarette and smoked like
tobacco. It can also be boiled in chemical apparatus made of glass com-
monly known as a "bong" and its vapor inhaled to produce a more potent
effect. Under the Minnesota statute possession of marijuana in different
forms carries the same penalty." Similarly, cocaine powder can be, and
most often is, ingested through the nasal passages by snorting. It can also
be smoked in a rock form, or its vapor inhaled, once the hydrochloride is
removed through a heating process. Although the drastic effects of cocaine
use are admittedly not analogous to marijuana, the same principle of legis-
lative intent should apply to all illegal drugs: Substance over form; not form
over substance.
However, Kennedy's dissension with the Russell decision lay deeper
than a mere objection to the analysis. Kennedy denounces the court's be-
lief that the disparate impact of the statute is harmful to African-Ameri-
cans." He contends that the court's characterization of the crack/powder
cocaine punishment disparity as a burden to African-Americans as a class
is "simplistic."46 Citing Professor Kate Smith, Kennedy argues that the
conviction of crack cocaine offenders benefits law-abiding citizens and
should be perceived as a "laudatory attempt to provide enhanced protec-
tion to [African-American] communities."47 What Kennedy fails to realize
is that when "enhanced protection" violates equal protection, law enforce-
ment should be challenged no matter how laudatory the efforts. The fol-
lowing section challenges Kennedy's arguments from this premise.
III. CRITIQUING KENNEDY'S COMMENT
A. Gdneral Critique
The first flaw with Kennedy's thesis on race and law enforcement is
that it embarks from the premise that allegations of racial discrimination
often exaggerate and undermine admirable efforts to eliminate crime in
African-American communities." Essentially, Kennedy contends that we
are our own worst enemies:49 We are our own victims in crime and we deny
43. Id. at 1265.
44. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 152.02, 152.09 (1996).
45. Kennedy, Comment, supra note 3, 1266-69.
46. Id. at 1266-67.
47. Id. at 1267.
48. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
49. See Kennedy, Comment, supra note 3, at 1259 ("The most lethal danger facing African
Americans in their day-to-day lives is not white, racist officials of the state, but private, violent
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ourselves the protection of the criminal justice system by crying racism in
the face of legitimate crime prevention efforts. However, what Kennedy
glibly calls the "rhetoric of paranoia""° is a legitimate and well-founded
fear of persecution by a people who have suffered a egregious history of
racial oppression and continue to be plagued by its effects. Kennedy's
claim that this "paranoia" "stifles intelligent debate over drug policy"'" is
implicitly contradicted by his own claim that there are varying views within
the African-American community regarding law enforcement-a strong in-
dication that intelligent community dialogue exists.5 2
In addition, Kennedy exhibits a sort of "selective suspicion" of the
criminal justice system that is inconsistent with his general repudiation of
racial discrimination claims based solely on disparate impact. Kennedy can
fathom racial discrimination without proof of intent in order to fortify his
race-of-the-victim discrimination theory, but in the same breath, he disre-
gards as "paranoia" suspicions that increased law enforcement that yields
disparate effects could be racist.5 3  This point commands further
examination.
Kennedy asserts that the criminal justice system devalues African-
American victims due to racism or mere indifference derived from a pro-
pensity to identify with, and thus avenge the rights of, crime victims of
one's own race.5 1 If racism were the cause of this statistically supported
claim, 5 would it not be at least plausible that similar racist sentiments
might subconsciously motivate the legislature to enact laws that punish
more severely members of that devalued group or, at least, provide a safe
harbor for legislative indifference? 56 Apparently, such a notion would con-
stitute mere "rhetoric" in Kennedy's school of thought despite Kennedy's
acknowledgment that "for most of the nation's history, blacks were de-
criminals (typically black) who attack those most vulnerable to them without regard to racial
identity.").
50. Id at 1260 ("Such overheated allegations of racism obscure analysis of a wide range of
problems in the criminal justice system. Consider, for example, the stifling of intelligent debate
over drug policy by the rhetoric of paranoia.").
51. See id.
52. See id. at 1273-74 & nn.80-82.
53. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
54. See Kennedy, McClesky, supra note 19, at 1396, ("[R]ace-based devaluations of human
life constitute simply one instance of a universal phenomenon: the propensity for persons to em-
pathize more fully with those with whom they can identify."). Kennedy does not acknowledge
that this seemingly innocuous human phenomenon might be the product of racism which impedes
one's ability to identify with other persons based on the commonality of human-ness and, instead,
focuses on race.
55. For example, in McClesky v. Kemp, the defendant presented evidence from the most
comprehensive study on death sentencing in a single state which demonstrated that convicted
killers of whites were 11 times as likely to get the death penalty than convicted killers of Blacks.
107 S.Ct. at 1763. For a more detailed discussion of this data and of discrimination in death
sentencing generally, see, Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of
the Death Penalty, A Challenge to the State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REV. 133 (1986);
Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experi-
ence, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983); Baldus et al., Identifying Comparatively Exces-
sive Sentences at Death: A Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1980).
56. One scholar has set forth what might constitute proof that the legislature was strongly
motivated by race when enacting the Sentencing Guidelines. David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race,
and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1293-97 (1995) (discussing white America's percep-
tion of Blacks and their role in the crack epidemic).
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nied" civil order and criminal protection.57 Kennedy suggests that African
Americans leave it up to this same, albeit slightly more integrated, justice
system to provide them with criminal protection from each other without
considering evidence of disparate impact absent proof of discriminatory
intent.
However, proof of discriminatory intent should not be the distinguish-
ing factor between those laws that are constitutionally invalid and those
that are not.58 As constitutional law scholar Lawrence Tribe poignantly
noted,
This [focus on discriminatory intent] overlooks the fact that minorities
can also be injured when the government is 'only' indifferent to their suf-
fering or 'merely' blind to how prior official discrimination contributed to
it and how current acts perpetuate it.
If a government is barred from enacting laws with an eye to invidious
discrimination against a particular group, it should not be free to visit the
same wrong whenever it happens to be looking the other way. If a state
may not club a minority with its fist, surely it may not do so with the back
of its hand.59
Hence, intentional or not, discrimination is an evil that is forbidden under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, while direct proof of discrimi-
natory intent sometimes exists, it often does not because it is either intangi-
ble or undetectable. Nonetheless, harmful and discriminatory legislation
should not go unchallenged.
In addition, Kennedy seems to ignore the very obvious concerns that
motivate the opposition to strong law enforcement measures in the Afri-
can-American community. First, there is a rational and coherent desire to
redirect law enforcement efforts at the root causes of criminal activity, for
example the importation of illegal substances into the United States, and
particularly, into the African-American community. Many African Ameri-
cans feel that, although we might be responsible for the dissemination of
narcotics within in our communities, we are not responsible for importing
these substances into our communities, and therefore should not be the
main targets of strong-arm drug policy.6" Second, there is a belief that at
least some African-Americans commit crime as a result of the societal ra-
57. Kennedy, Comment, supra note 3, at 1267. Kennedy squarely admits that "in many con-
texts, in comparison to the treatment accorded to whites, blacks have been denied quite literally
the equal protection of the law." Id. at 1268. Nonetheless, Kennedy advocates an approach to
invalidating discriminatory legislation that is contingent upon proof of discriminatory intent. Id.
at 1270-76.
58. But see id. at 1257 ("The presence of a racially discriminatory purpose distinguishes those
laws that are specifically racial, and therefore presumptively invalid, from those that merely give
rise to racially disparate consequences that disadvantage some African-Americans while benefit-
ting others.").
59. McClesky, 477 N.W.2d at n.2 (quoting Laurence Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTIrrUTIONAL
LAW 1518-19 (2d. ed. 1988)),
60. See, e.g., Black Leaders Call For Class-Action Lawsuit Over Crack Allegations, THE As-
SOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 30, 1996 (Attorney seeks plaintiffs for a class action lawsuit against the
government following accusations that the CIA deliberately introduced the drug into black com-
munities); Joe W. Straley, Another Shocker, THE NEWS & OBSERVER RALEIGH, Sept. 15, 1996
(Editorial/Opinion) ("[Tihe CIA knew of but took no action against certain key drug lords who
managed to deal a double whammy by first introducing crack cocaine to thousands of poor black
youths in Los Angeles while siphoning off the profits to arm the FDN contras in Nicaragua.").
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cism that exists outside the law enforcement context. This belief translates
into a reluctance to prosecute these persons to the fullest extent of the law
regardless of the safety that the incarceration of these offenders might
offer.
Finally, Kennedy's proposed solution for defeating undesirable legisla-
tion is to challenge it through the legislative process as African Americans
have successfully done in the past.61 Indeed, Kennedy asserts,
It is only the presence of [evidence of discriminatory purpose] that can
justifiably give the judiciary confidence that the challenged policy fails to
meet the minimal demands of constitutional decency .... [11n the ab-
sence of findings of discriminatory purpose (or some such other violation
of constitutional norms) legislatures are more fitting fora than courts for
such calculations.
Although Kennedy is correct in pointing out that African-Americans
have gained increased access to the legislature and have fought and won
battles on this front, Kennedy ignores the appeal, not to mention the right,
to confront legislation through the court system due to its expediency and
accessibility. In addition, Kennedy's qualified statement that only "certain
sectors deemed to be acting on behalf of the whole"6 have had success in
pursuing claims through the legislature highlights an additional flaw with
his proposal: Subset groups within the minority community, whether be-
cause of economic or educational disenfranchisement, have limited access
to legislative fora in which to voice their views which form part of the in-
traracial conflict over law enforcement policy. Although underrepresenta-
tion is a problem that is inherent in the legislative process, it frustrates
Kennedy's primary reason for seeking justice primarily through the legisla-
ture-the inability of the judiciary to give adequate attention to the in-
traracial conflict surrounding law enforcement policy.
Thus, Kennedy's arguments for increased law enforcement protection
and against considering claims of discrimination absent proof of discrimina-
tory intent suffer from the same flaw which he argues exists in the Russell
court's analysis-a disregard of actual effects and of the reality of the status
quo.
B. Implications in the State/Federal Prosecution Context
Taken to their logical conclusion, Kennedy's arguments raise rather
interesting concerns in the context of selective prosecution.63 Because
Kennedy presumes benevolent legislative intent absent conclusive evidence
of discriminatory intent, there must be laws to facilitate access to such
proof for the doctrine of equal protection and its derivative claims to pro-
61. Kennedy, Comment, supra note 3 at 76-77 ("Over the past quarter-century when "con-
demned" to the electoral arena, blacks-or, more accurately, certain sectors of the black popula-
tion deemed to be acting on behalf of the whole-have succeeded in obtaining through legislation
political goods that the federal judiciary had declined to give them through federal constitutional
legislation."); see also id. at 1277 & n.92 (noting that the affirmative action legislation, the Voting
Rights Act Amendments, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, were enacted by the legislature when
efforts to confront these issues in the judiciary failed).
62. Id. at 1277.
63. Selective Prosecution is a claim, raised by a defendant in a criminal trial, which alleges
that the defendant was prosecuted on the basis of his race, sex, age, sexual orientation, or other
suspect classifications under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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vide meaningful relief. In other words, Kennedy's theory cannot exist in a
vacuum; rather, it must provide for correlative discovery rules and addi-
tional claims based on the theory of equal protection, such as selective
prosecution, to minimize the enormous burden placed on defendants to
prove discriminatory intent. A recent Supreme Court case illustrates just
this point.
In United States v. Armstrong,' the Supreme Court held that, in order
for a defendant bringing a claim for selective prosecution based on racial
discrimination to be entitled to discovery, she must present evidence that
the government knew of, but failed to prosecute, similarly situated suspects
of other races.65 At trial, five African-American defendants filed a Motion
for Discovery and/or Dismissal of Indictment for Selective Prosecution.'
Each defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine base
under federal statutes, and some were charge with selling cocaine base
under a federal statute which imposes a minimum of ten years and a maxi-
mum of life imprisonment for selling more than fifty grams of cocaine
base.67 By contrast, California's statutory analogue for selling crack co-
caine carries a minimum of three years and maximum of five years for the
exact same offense. 68
Unlike the Russell defendants, the defendants in Armstrong did not
challenge the legislation under which they were indicted. Rather, they
challenged the government's law enforcement practice. Specifically, these
defendants brought a selective prosecution claim challeging the govern-
ment's decision to prosecute them and every other defendant whose case
was closed by the Federal Public Defender in 1991-all of whom are Afri-
can-American-under federal rather than state law.69 In light of this evi-
dence and the gross disparity in punishment under federal and state law,
the district held that the defendants had provided a "colorable basis" to
compel discovery7" for a claim of selective prosecution. 71 Furthermore, the
district court held that "a direct showing of discriminatory intent is not
always necessary to make out a equal protection claim"'72 and that circum-
64. 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
65. Id. at 1480.
66. 48 F.3d 1508, 1511.
67. 21 U.S.C. § 846, 841(a)(1) (1996); see also id. at 2356.
68. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352.5 (Deering 1993); see also Armstrong, No. 93-
50031, Adv. No 93-50037, at 2356.
69. Id. at 1511.
70. The Honorable Consuelo B. Marshall, District Judge, ordered the government to provide
the following to the defense:
(1) A list of all cases form the prior three years in which the government charged both
cocaine base offenses and firearm offenses;
(2) The race of the defendant(s) in each of those cases;
(3) Whether each case was investigated by federal, state or joint law enforcement au-
thorities; and,
(4) An explanation of the criteria used by the United states Attorney's office for decid-
ing whether to bring cocaine base cases federally.
Id. at 2382 (Rymer, J. dissenting). Judge Marshall imposed a penalty for non-compliance
whereby the indictments against all five defendants would be dropped.
71. Id. at 1268-75.
72. Id. at 2361.
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stantial evidence is sufficient to establish a colorable basis.73 In its ration-
ale, the court noted that "blanket denials of discrimination though often
(but not always) made in good faith, are to be expected in cases such as
these" however, "[tihe availability of discovery must not turn on the un-
likely event that a federal prosecutor will confess to private biases."74
The district court issued an order dismissing indictments against the
defendants because the prosecution failed to produce court-compelled evi-
dence during the discovery proceedings of the defendants' selective prose-
cution.75 On appeal, the government claimed that the district judge abused
her discretion in requiring discovery.76 The Ninth Circuit sitting en banc
held that compelling discovery did not constitute an abuse of discretion
where the defendants presented sufficient evidence to establish a "colora-
ble basis"77 that the government engaged in discriminatory prosecution.78
In reversing this decision, the Supreme Court imposed a "correspond-
ingly rigorous" discovery standard to the already rigorous standards for
proving a claim for selective prosecution. 79 Evidence that in every case
closed by the Office of the Federal Public Defender the defendant was an
African American accompanied by a study indicating whether such
defednants were prosecuted for dealing powder or crack cocaine is insuffi-
cient to entitle a defendant to discovery.80 Instead, the Court suggested
that the Armstrong defendants could have obtained discovery by submit-
ting evidence that similarly situated suspects of other races were known to
the government and were prosecuted in state rather that federal court.
81
Thus, in order to be entitled to discovery, a defendant must produce the
very sort of evidence which the tool of discovery is most apt at disclosing.
In apparent anticipation of the criticism that its opinion might elicit,
the Court stated that "[t]he similarly situated requirement does not make a
selective prosecution claim impossible to prove." It is difficult to envision,
however, how defendants bringing selective prosecution claims will succeed
at making an evidentiary showing under Armstrong when they are denied
the valuable tool of discovery which is afforded to most other claimants
upon stating a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, if
Kennedy insists on requiring proof of discriminatory intent to challenge
law enforcement then he should simultaneously advocate for low-threshold
discovery rules so that criminal defendants are afforded pragmatic and lib-
eral means by which to defend their constitutional rights. Kennedy's argu-
ments standing alone cannot claim to be in the best interests of the
73. Id. at 2361 ("A circumstantial showing of intent may be based on evidence of discrimina-
tory effects.")
74. Id. at 2374.
75. Id. at 2355.
76. Id.
77. The colorable basis standard is met by 'some evidence tending to show the essential
elements of the claim.' United States v. Heidecke, 900 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1990). ...
'[To] obtain discovery on a selective prosecution claim, the defendant must present spe-
cific facts, not mere allegations, which establish a colorable basis for the existence of
both discriminatory intent on the part of the government actors. Id. at 2360 (emphasis in
original) (quoting United States v. Bourgeois, 964 F.2d 935, 939 (9th Cir. 1992)).
78. Armstrong, No. 93-50031, Adv. No 93-50037, at 2375-76.
79. Armstrong III, at 1488.
80. See id. at 1483, 1489.
81. Id. at 1489.
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African-American community. However, coupled with procedural rules
that are reasonably solicitous to discrimination claims, his alternative con-
ception of criminal law and law enforcement might yield positive results.
IV. CONCLUSION
While I agree with the fundamental premise of Kennedy's argument
that crime is an overwhelming problem in the African-American commu-
nity that needs to be forcefully addressed I propose to develop Kennedy's
good intention into a community-oriented approach that would better
serve the interests of our community by recognizing and validating wide-
spread misgivings toward the criminal justice system and law enforcement.
My approach differs from Kennedy's in that it recognizes that, although
African Americans have made successful strides toward achieving racial
equality, the pervasive fear and suspicion of the criminal justice system
among African Americans suggest that it is in our collective best interest to
safeguard against perceived injustices by continuing to uphold the notion
that disparate impact can prove discriminatory intent.82 If the effect is not
present, then whether there is malevolent intent is, for the most part, in-
consequential. It is the effect-the perceived, though debated, harm-that
we must address.
Kennedy argues that harm to a subset of a minority group, specifically,
criminal offenders, does not harm the minority as a class.83 However, a
true community-oriented approach would consider the best interests of a
community as a whole and perfect a cost-benefit analysis that identified
and weighed the concerns of all community members. Kennedy's approach
is based on a non-existent distinction between the constitutional right to
equal protection of law-abiding African-Americans and African-Ameri-
cans who commit crimes. However, the right to equal protection is inalien-
able and thus must be protected by the entire community if one of its
member's rights is being violated.
Kennedy might argue in response that African-Americans should not
focus on whether or to what extent whites are punished for the same or
similar crimes so long as the African-American community will benefit
from having the evils of crack cocaine removed from its neighborhoods.
However, in acting as a community, we are obligated to protect the rights
of community members who commit criminal offenses as well as law-abid-
ing citizens. Furthermore, the Russell decision demonstrates that by point-
ing out injustice and fighting discrimination, we do not necessarily
undermine our own protection. Indeed, the Minnesota legislature's re-
sponse to Russell is a prime example of how to achieve equality without
curtailing protective enforcement.
After Russell, the Minnesota legislature equalized the punishment
among cocaine offenders. Now powder cocaine offenders in Minnesota
face the same penalties as crack cocaine offenders. Although Kennedy
points out that this may have eviscerated the deterrent effect against crack
82. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66(1977) (holding that racial disparities can be evidence of discriminatory purpose although prevail-
ing solely on disparate impact is rare).
83. Kennedy, Comment, supra note 3, at 1257.
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cocaine use and distribution, absent evidence that powder cocaine offend-
ers were actually deterred from committing crack cocaine offenses because
of the sentencing differential, this argument does not outweigh the justice
that was created.
It is true that crime is a great foe of the African-American community.
Consequently, many willingly defer to the legislature to determine punish-
ment and few would advocate that the state play a disinterested role in
enforcing laws in our community. However, in light of the invidious history
of racial oppression in the United States, any law or law enforcement prac-
tice that has a demonstrable, disparate impact on African Americans as a
whole, or a subset of their community, should undergo constitutional scru-
tiny to establish whether there is, at least, a rational basis for that legisla-
tion or enforcement practice. Ultimately, the issue is in whether
punishment and enforcement are meted out equally among society's simi-
larly-situated offenders. Russell and Armstrong represent just two contexts
in which they are not and Kennedy's proposal represents just another way
to ensure that they will not be.

